

THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS: A STUDY OWNERSHIP ON ESG DISCLOSURE

Ari Susanto¹, Novita², Imam Nurcahyo Fambudi³

Universitas Trilogi¹²³

²Corresponding author: novita_1210@trilogi.ac.id

INFORMASI ARTIKEL

Article history:

Dikirim tanggal: 6/11/2024

Revisi pertama tanggal: 24/11/2024

Diterima tanggal: 8/12/2024

Tersedia online tanggal: 26/12/2024

ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji dampak keterlibatan pemangku kepentingan, yaitu kepemilikan asing dan institusional, terhadap pengungkapan ESG serta bagaimana hubungan tersebut dimoderasi oleh dewan komisaris independen. Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel 108 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI selama periode 2019–2021. Analisis data dilakukan dengan metode Ordinary Least Square (OLS) menggunakan model random effect. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan asing, kepemilikan institusional, dan dewan komisaris independen memiliki pengaruh positif terhadap pengungkapan ESG. Selain itu, dewan komisaris independen terbukti memperkuat hubungan antara kepemilikan institusional dengan pengungkapan ESG. Sebaliknya, ukuran perusahaan sebagai variabel kontrol tidak memberikan dampak terhadap pengungkapan ESG. Penelitian ini menyarankan perusahaan di sub-sektor manufaktur untuk meningkatkan pengungkapan ESG, yang dapat didorong melalui kehadiran kepemilikan asing dan institusional.

Kata Kunci: Dewan Komisaris Independen, Kepemilikan Asing, Kepemilikan Institusional, Pengungkapan ESG, Ukuran Perusahaan.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine the impact of stakeholder involvement, namely foreign and institutional ownership, on ESG disclosure and how the relationship is moderated by the independent board of commissioners. This study uses a sample of 108 manufacturing companies listed on the IDX during the 2019-2021 period. Data analysis was carried out using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method using a random effect model. The results showed that foreign ownership, institutional ownership, and independent boards of commissioners have a positive influence on ESG disclosure. In addition, an independent board of commissioners is proven to strengthen the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure. In contrast, company size as a control variable has no impact on ESG disclosure. This study suggests companies in the manufacturing sub-sector increase ESG disclosure, which can be encouraged through the presence of foreign and institutional ownership.

Keywords: ESG Disclosure, Firm Size, Foreign Ownership, Independent Board of Commissioners, Institutional Ownership.



1. Introduction

Environmental concerns have been a central topic of global attention for a long time, leading the United Nations (UN) to establish World Environment Day as an effort to address environmental health challenges that affect various aspects of life, including economic development (Husain, 2019). Utilizing resources to optimize profits frequently has adverse effects on the environment. Therefore, companies should expand their focus beyond just environmental concerns to encompass social and governance issues as well (Antonius & Ida, 2023).

Increasing awareness of ESG considerations is making them a crucial factor in investment decisions. ESG is considered important for assessing a company's objectives, strategy, and quality of management, with a quarter of global investment funds in 2019 focusing on companies with strong ESG credentials (Olahkarsa, 2022). ESG issues are used by investors to evaluate the long-term stability and sustainability of companies. Consequently, companies must understand and implement ESG practices to attract and retain profitable investments.

ESG information is a fundamental need for investors in making decisions. ESG is an assessment of a company's sustainable performance across ESG issues. It reflects the responsibility of a company to manage its environmental and social impacts (Atan et al., 2018). ESG disclosure includes practices such as waste management, material and energy efficiency, and social responsibility (Afifah & Novita, 2021; Prameswari & Fambudi, 2024). The principles of GCG, including openness, accountability, responsibility, impartiality, and fairness, are critical to ensuring professional and credible management (Antonius & Ida, 2023; Ardina & Novita, 2023). In addition, the implementation of GCG also supports companies in achieving their goals and providing added value to shareholders (Dian & Novita, 2019).

ESG disclosure is a new approach to measuring Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by providing measurable metrics and clear standards, different from CSR which is often difficult to quantify (Olahkarsa, 2022). ESG allows companies to report performance in a more structured way, making it key to long-term success (CRMS, 2024; Fauziah et al., 2024). ESG disclosures typically follow Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards, which ensure transparency in corporate responsibility reports (GRI, 2024). Latifah & Widiatmoko (2022) identify the ownership structure as a key factor that has an impact on ESG disclosure. The more numerous and diverse stakeholders who need company information, the more detailed the disclosures submitted by the company (Singal & Putra, 2019).

Along with the importance of ESG disclosure, the ownership structure is a key determinant of how deep and comprehensive ESG reporting should be. The more numerous and diverse the stakeholders who need company information, the more detailed the disclosures submitted by the company (Singal & Putra, 2019). One aspect of the company's ownership structure is foreign ownership. Referring to Law No. 25 of 2007, Article 1(6), foreign ownership includes foreign natural persons and foreign companies investing in the Republic of Indonesia. Al Amosh & Khatib (2022) explain that having foreign shareholders may increase trust and transparency between

companies and their stakeholders. Significant impact on ESG disclosure of increasing foreign ownership (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022; Fuadah et al., 2022). This is because foreign investors tend to prefer companies that disclose ESG practices to reduce investment risk in the long run. Foreign share ownership can improve the quality of corporate management and enhance value for stakeholders by encouraging transparency in ESG disclosure (Fuadah et al., 2022). The more foreign-owned a company becomes, the greater the incentive to disclose ESG information voluntarily and comprehensively.

Fambudi et al. (2023) highlight the increasing awareness of investors and stakeholders of the importance of ESG for corporate sustainability. One of the main factors influencing ESG disclosure is institutional ownership, which is share ownership by entities such as insurance companies, banks, securities, and other financial institutions (Singal & Putra, 2019). As the dominant shareholder, institutional ownership plays an important role in overseeing company management and encouraging transparency in sustainability reports. Ownership by institutional investors drives voluntary ESG disclosures, as these practices are often viewed as indicators of effective corporate management. This enables a more objective assessment of the company, long-term risk management, and improved sustainability quality (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022; Fuadah et al., 2022; Qasem et al., 2022). Other studies by Sibuea & Arieftiara (2022); Yani & Suputra (2020); and Zaid et al. (2020) also confirm that institutional ownership is not only beneficial in managing risk and reputation but also strengthens the integration of sustainability principles in long-term business strategies. Thus, as institutional ownership increases, so does the pressure on companies to disclose more ESG information for sustainability and competitive advantage.

Independent commissioners have a strategic role in ensuring the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) and improving the transparency of ESG disclosures. Based on Law No. 40/2007 and OJK Regulation No. 33/POJK.04/2014, at least 30% of the board of commissioners must be independent, with no affiliation with major shareholders or management. The existence of this board allows for more effective oversight of business strategies, encourages decision-making that is free from bias, and ensures corporate compliance with ESG standards, such as GRI (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022). Research shows that independent boards of commissioners can strengthen the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure, promoting greater transparency and accountability, particularly in companies with a significant proportion of independent boards of commissioners (Zaid et al., 2020). In addition, they play a role in balancing corporate social and operational responsibilities, ensuring stakeholders are well-represented, and reducing conflicts of interest (Fernández-Gago et al., 2018). This makes companies more motivated to fulfill institutional shareholders' demands regarding sustainability practices, thereby improving the quality of ESG disclosures while reducing long-term risks.

This study evaluates the effect of ownership structure, including foreign and institutional ownership, on ESG disclosure in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2019-2021. The novelty of this study lies in exploring the moderating role of the independent board of commissioners in strengthening the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure, thus addressing a previously

overlooked research gap (Zaid et al., 2020). By addressing the role of the independent board of commissioners, this study not only enriches the corporate governance literature (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022; Fuadah et al., 2022; Latifah & Widiatmoko, 2022) but also offers relevant new insights to support future research development.

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development

To elucidate the correlation between ownership structure and ESG disclosure, the theoretical framework incorporates stakeholder, legitimacy, and agency theory. Stakeholder theory posits that companies operate with consideration for the interests of various stakeholders, not just their own. Companies must also provide value to a diverse array of stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, communities, and other interest groups (Freeman et al., 2021). This theory highlights the importance of considering the concerns and needs of stakeholders who are affected by the company's decisions. Building and maintaining positive relationships with all stakeholders. In Indonesia, ESG implementation by companies is increasing, which not only improves the company's image but also provides positive benefits for society and the environment (Latifah & Widiatmoko, 2022). The influence of foreign and institutional ownership on ESG disclosure practices, with foreign investors often demanding higher standards, while institutional investors tend to favour investments that address environmental and social issues, helping to improve corporate reputation and sustainability performance (Ningwati et al., 2022).

Legitimacy theory suggests that to gain recognition and legitimacy, companies must conform to social norms and meet society's expectations. This theory emphasizes the responsibility of companies to operate in alignment with the constraints, standards, and societal values set out in the 'social contract', as outlined by (Ghozali, 2020). Companies that fail to meet society's expectations risk facing sanctions such as legal restrictions, resource limitations, and consumer boycotts (Ghozali, 2020). As companies depend on the environment and society for resources, they must manage their social and environmental impacts responsibly. Doing so ensures long-term sustainability and creates business opportunities, as well as attracting investors focused on sustainable investments. By showing concern for ESG, companies can enhance their reputation and strengthen their social legitimacy (Darma et al., 2019).

The theory of agencies describes the contractual relationship between company owners, who are principals, and management, who function as agents. Management's role is to execute the interests of the owners on their behalf. Agency conflicts tend to occur more frequently when share ownership is widely dispersed, compared to more concentrated ownership. To reduce this conflict, management is often compelled to disclose information transparently to prove compliance with shareholder interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The independent commissioners play a function in mitigating agency conflicts by guaranteeing that management exercises its duties in the interests of the owners (Zaid et al., 2020). A strong governance structure with significant institutional and foreign ownership can attract professional investors, and encourage companies to be active in ESG disclosure practices, which demonstrate the

company's sustainability achievements beyond mere financial performance (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022). Based on stakeholder, legitimacy, and agency theory, a more significant company ownership structure increases the likelihood of ESG disclosure adoption.

One important aspect of a company's ownership structure is foreign ownership. Foreign shareholders play an important role in promoting transparency and fostering confidence between corporate entities and their stakeholders (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022). Foreign investors are more willing to select companies with a good record of social responsibility and environmental performance to maximize their investment and reduce long-term risk (Zaid et al., 2020). Their presence also raises the expectations of stakeholders and lends legitimacy to the activities of the company (Fuadah et al., 2022). Foreign ownership and CSR disclosure levels are positively and significantly related (Al Amosh & Mansor, 2020; Baba & Baba, 2021; Latifah & Widiatmoko, 2022; Yani & Suputra, 2020). Foreign investors usually pay more attention to transparency in corporate social obligations, which encourages companies to provide more detailed and accurate information regarding CSR initiatives. Risks caused by information asymmetry can increase potential losses for foreign investors, so CSR plays an important role in reducing this risk (Guo & Zheng, 2021; Zaid et al., 2020). In addition, significant foreign ownership may encourage companies to voluntarily disclose detailed and comprehensive ESG information (Amidjaya & Widagdo, 2019). Incentives to disclose ESG information tend to be higher for companies with high levels of foreign ownership. This step not only increases transparency but also improves corporate governance and increases value for stakeholders. Consequently, an increase in foreign ownership of a corporation is accompanied by a corresponding rise in the motivation to provide comprehensive and detailed ESG disclosures. Based on this premise, the first hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H₁: Foreign ownership has a positive effect on ESG disclosure.

Increasing awareness among investors and stakeholders of the significance of ESG issues in guaranteeing the long-term sustainability of companies (Fambudi et al., 2023). A major factor influencing the extent of ESG disclosure is institutional ownership. Institutional owners have an essential role in driving ESG transparency and disclosure, mainly due to their long-term focus which requires more intensive oversight of management (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022). The degree of institutional ownership directly influences the level of ESG disclosure (Fuadah et al., 2022). Companies with institutional ownership gain legitimacy and a better reputation by showing attention to ESG aspects, which ultimately improves corporate ESG performance (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2022; Fuadah et al., 2022). Agency theory suggests that institutional shareholders have an incentive to oversee disclosure policy, given their status as experienced shareholders with sufficient resources to effectively monitor corporate strategies (Zaid et al., 2020).

Institutional shareholders, who hold most of the shares, have a long-term interest and are more likely than other shareholders to monitor and influence the strategic decisions made by the company (Qasem et al., 2022; Zaid et al., 2020). Its considerable strength and experience play a key role in implementing corporate governance that

protects the rights and interests of all shareholders. Institutional investors also know analyses of financial reports and sustainability reports as a basis for making investments (Latifah & Widiatmoko, 2022; Sibuea & Arieftiara, 2022; Singal & Putra, 2019; Yani & Suputra, 2020).

Institutional ownership provides many benefits to companies, such as improved risk management, better reputation, and the implementation of sustainability principles in long-term business strategies. Therefore, the incentive for companies to be more transparent in their ESG disclosure increases as institutional ownership increases. Based on this understanding, the following hypotheses are proposed for consideration in this research:

H₂: Institutional ownership has a positive effect on ESG disclosure.

The independent board of commissioners has no financial, managerial, shareholding, or family relationships with the board, the non-executive directors, shareholders, or other parties within the company that might compromise their ability to operate independently. The independent commissioners fulfill agency theory by being in an ideal position to carry out supervisory functions, ensure GCG implementation, and ensure integrity in financial reporting (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The independent commissioners provide the company with enhanced strategic decision-making and ESG policy-making capacity while encouraging management to adopt a more proactive approach to disclosing ESG-related information (Kamaludin et al., 2022).

The independent commissioners have a central responsibility to ensure effective communication of corporate responsibility, maintaining a balance between business objectives and social responsibility (Chebbi & Ammer, 2022). Through ESG disclosure, the independent commissioners promote transparency as a means of demonstrating the company's capacity to align performance with sustainable development. Monitoring of the ESG of the company becomes more intensive as the level of independent board members rises (Septiana & Puspawati, 2022). Independent commissioners do by no means always encourage active CSR disclosure (Khan et al., 2021; Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). They tend to focus more on financial evaluation and protection of minority shareholders' rights, despite their expertise and good reputation. Given the inconsistency in findings across earlier research, the researcher proposes the following hypothesis:

H₃: The independent board of commissioners has a positive effect on ESG disclosure.

Independent board of commissioners has a crucial responsibility to strengthen corporate governance by making decisions that are objective and free from the influence of vested interests (Romano et al., 2020). An independent commissioner is a crucial element in guaranteeing that the company is managed in the shareholders' best interests. Additionally, it helps to mitigate agency conflicts with stakeholders and reinforce the legitimacy of the corporation in question (Fernández-Gago et al., 2018). It is anticipated that the appointment of additional independent commissioners will enhance the capacity of the company to address the needs of its stakeholders and maintain its market standing.

In related research, Zaid et al. (2020) posit the view that independent commissioners represent a vital component in the development of a more robust relationship between institutional ownership and corporate disclosure practices in Palestine. Furthermore, Al Amosh & Khatib (2022) suggest that an independent commissioner can facilitate enhanced information transparency and strengthen the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure. This approach can help maintain company legitimacy and fulfill stakeholder expectations. This perspective is further supported by evidence indicating heightened levels of involvement in ESG activities by independent boards of commissioners, as documented in the studies by (Cucari et al., 2018; Husted & Sousa-Filho, 2019). The appointment of additional independent boards of commissioners could encourage companies to adopt a more responsive approach to stakeholder demands about ESG disclosure (Ortas et al., 2017). In the context of the previously outlined considerations, this research proposes the following hypothesis:

3. Research Method

This study employs a quantitative approach, using secondary data from annual and financial reports of companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). These reports are accessible via the official IDX website (www.idx.co.id) and the official websites of related companies during the 2019-2021 period. The research population comprises companies in the manufacturing sub-sector listed on the IDX and included in the ESGI Unair database. The sampling process was conducted using purposive sampling, with the parameters adjusted to align with the research objectives (Sugiyono, 2019). The total sample obtained was 108 samples for the 2019-2021 period. For the analysis of the data, we used the panel data regression method, which is a combination of time series and cross-sectional techniques, to test the variables of the research model.

This research tests 2 models, namely a model without moderation and a model with moderation interactions. Robustness tests were performed to validate the reliability of these models. Here is the first model with moderation interactions, testing the role of the independent board of commissioners as a moderating variable, intending to strengthen the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure.

$$ESGD_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FROWN_{i,t} + \beta_2 INOWN_{i,t} + \beta_3 IBOC_{i,t} + \beta_4 SIZE_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \dots \dots (1)$$

The second model in this study, with moderation interactions, tests the impact of foreign ownership structure, institutional ownership, and independent board on ESG disclosure.

Where,

ESGDi, t = ESG Disclosure, company i at the end of year-end t;

FROWN_{i, t} = Foreign Ownership, company i at the end of year-end t.

INOWNi, t = Institutional Ownership, company i at the end of year-end t

IBOCi.t = Independent Board of Commissioners company i at the end of year-end t

SIZE_{i, t} = Firm Size, company *i* at the end of year-end *t*.
 β_0 = Constanta
 $\beta_1 - \beta_6$ = Coefficient Regression
 $\varepsilon_{i, t}$ = error term

Table 1. Variables Measurement

No.	Variables	Measurement	Reference
1.	Environmental Social and Governance Disclosure (ESGD)	ESGD = Number of Indicators disclosed by the Company / Number of Indicators provided	(Aristiningtyas & Fidiana, 2023; Fambudi et al., 2023)
2.	Foreign Ownership (FROWN)	FROWN = Total Foreign Ownership / Total Share Outstanding x 100%	(Fuadah et al., 2022)
3.	Institutional Ownership (INOWN)	INOWN = Total Institutional Ownership / Total Share Outstanding x 100%	(Singal & Putra, 2019)
4.	Independent Board of Commissioners (IBOC)	IBOC = Total Independent Board of Commissioners / Total Board of Commissioners x 100%	(Zaid et al., 2020)
5.	Firm Size (SIZE)	SIZE = Ln (Total Aset)	(Isyauqina & Fambudi, 2024)

4. Result and Discussion

Table 2 presents a comprehensive overview of the descriptive statistics for all variables incorporated in this research project. The ESG disclosure variable has a mean of 0.2092 from 108 observations, but this value is lower than the standard deviation of 0.2715, suggesting a high degree of data variation in this study's ESG variable. And there is the lowest value of 0.0000. This indicates that there are companies that do not disclose ESG information. The mean foreign ownership variable is 0.3355, this value indicates that the majority of Indonesian manufacturing companies are held by local investors. The standard deviation value of foreign ownership is 0.2061, which shows that there's not a lot of variation in foreign ownership.

The mean institutional ownership is 0.7208, highlighting a significant institutional contribution. The standard deviation value is 0.1764, indicating that institutional ownership exhibits a relatively low level of variation. The mean independent board of commissioners variable is 0.3032, in accordance with the provisions of the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) in regulation number 33/POJK.04/2014, which states that the board of commissioners must consist of 2 independent board members or at least 30%. Also, the standard deviation figure for the variable independent commissioners is 0.1730, indicating that there is low variation in this area. The mean value for the firm size control variable is 29.3768, with a standard deviation of 1.9377. This implies that there is minimal variation in the size of the firm.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Maximum	Minimum	Std. Dev.
ESGD	0.2092	0.9000	0.0000	0.2715
FROWN	0.3355	0.8276	0.0007	0.2061
INOWN	0.7208	0.9918	0.1753	0.1764
IBOC	0.3032	0.6667	0.0000	0.1764
SIZE	29.3768	32.6600	25.0500	1.9377
Total Observation	108			

Notes: ESGD – ESG disclosure, FROWN – Foreign ownership, INOWN – Institutional ownership, IBOC – Independent board of commissioners, SIZE – Firm size

Table 3 provides the test result without moderating variables, finding that there are three significant hypotheses. Foreign and institutional ownership positively influence ESG disclosure with coefficients of 0.4562 and 1.1175 respectively and significance levels below 1%. Furthermore, with a coefficient of 0.4283 and a level of significance below 1%, the independent commissioners also exert a positive influence. Conversely, firm size does not significantly affect ESG disclosure at the 10% significance level. The outcome of the first model indicates the potential for the variables to influence ESG disclosure with an F statistical probability of 0.0000.

Table 3. Test Results without Moderation

$ESGD_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FROWN_{i,t} + \beta_2 INOWN_{i,t} + \beta_3 IBOC_{i,t} + \beta_4 SIZE_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$					
Variable	Prediction	Coefficient	P-Value	VIF	Decision
FROWN	+	0.4562	0.00***	1.03	H ₁ Accepted
INOWN	+	1.1175	0.00***	1.05	H ₂ Accepted
IBOC	+	0.4283	0.00***	1.23	H ₃ Accepted
SIZE		0.0052	0.70	1.25	-
R ²	0.7744				
Adj-R ²	0.6501				
Prob (F-Statistic)	0.0000				
Model	RE				
Observation	108				

Notes: *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%

ESGD – ESG disclosure, FROWN – Foreign ownership, INOWN – Institutional ownership, IBOC – Independent board of commissioners, SIZE – Firm size

The test statistics in Table 4 show that the coefficient of the independent commissioners increased from 0.4283 without moderation to 0.7383 with moderation. This shows that it has been proven that the interaction of the independent board of commissioners acts as a pure moderator. In this way, the relationship between institutional ownership and ESG disclosure can be strengthened by the independent board of commissioners. In summary, the variables in model 2, which include the interaction of the independent board of commissioners, can influence ESG disclosure with a statistical F probability of 0.0000.

Table 4. Test Results with Moderation

$$ESGD_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FROWN_{i,t} + \beta_2 INOWN_{i,t} + \beta_3 INOWN_{i,t} * IBOC_{i,t} + \beta_4 SIZE_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Variable	Predicted Sign	Coefficient	P-Value	VIF	Decision
FROWN	+	0.4620	0.00***	1.03	H ₁ Accepted
INOWN	+	0.8885	0.00***	1.46	H ₂ Accepted
INOWN*IBOC	+	0.7383	0.00***	1.73	H ₄ Accepted
SIZE		0.0015	0.90	1.27	-
R ²		0.7990			
Adj-R ²		0.6837			
Prob (F-Statistic)		0.0000			
Model		RE			
Observation		108			

Notes: *** Significant at $\alpha=1\%$; ** Significant at $\alpha=5\%$; * Significant at $\alpha=10\%$; ESGD – ESG disclosure, FROWN – Foreign ownership, INOWN – Institutional ownership, IBOC – Independent board of commissioners, SIZE – Firm size

Table 5. Summary of Analysis Result

Variable	Prediction	Model 1		Model 2	
		Coefficient	p-value	Coefficient	p-value
FROWN	+	0.4620	0.00***	0.4562	0.00***
INOWN	+	0.8885	0.00***	1.1175	0.00***
IBOC	+		0.00***	0.4283	
INOWN*IBOC	+	0.7383			0.00***
SIZE		0.0015	0.90	0.0052	0.70
R ²		0.7990		0.7744	
Adj-R ²		0.6837		0.6501	
Model		RE		RE	
Observation		108		108	

Notes: *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%; ESGD – ESG disclosure, FROWN – Foreign ownership, INOWN – Institutional ownership, IBOC – Independent board of commissioners, SIZE – Firm size. Model 1 is the results with moderation; Model 2 is the results without moderation.

Table 5 indicates that the adjusted R² in model 1 by involving the interaction of moderating variables, the adjusted R² value increases to 0.6845. This indicates that the impact of the variables in the model on ESG disclosure is 68.37%, while the remaining 31.63% is accounted for by other variables not tested in this research. Meanwhile, Model 2 is 0.6501, meaning the variables in this model can influence ESG disclosure by 65.01%, while the other 34.99% is accounted for by variables not included in the research. The inclusion of Model 2 enhances this study by providing additional insights while demonstrating that Model 1 remains robust. The results confirm that Model 1 effectively captures the relationship between the tested variables and ESG disclosure, proving its reliability and strength in explaining ESG disclosure outcomes.

The results of this study indicate that the mean foreign ownership is quite high. This condition illustrates that high levels of foreign ownership tend to encourage

companies to provide more in-depth ESG disclosure to meet stakeholder expectations in line with international standards and to enhance the company's global reputation. Their presence also increases stakeholder aspirations and provides legitimacy to the activities of the company (Fuadah et al., 2022). This finding is corroborated by Al Amosh & Khatib (2022), Baba & Baba (2021), Latifah & Widiatmoko (2022), and Yani & Suputra (2020), that foreign ownership positively affects CSR disclosure, as one of the measures of ESG commitment. Foreign investors usually have a great concern for transparency in corporate social obligations, which encourages companies to provide more detailed precise information regarding CSR initiatives.

These findings indicate that information asymmetries can increase risk and potential losses for foreign investors (Guo & Zheng, 2021; Zaid et al., 2020). Thus, CSR is important to reduce information-related uncertainty. Al Amosh & Khatib (2022); Amidjaya & Widagdo (2019); Fuadah et al. (2022) reinforce this research by indicating that a significant percentage of foreign ownership can encourage companies to disclose ESG information voluntarily and thoroughly. By encouraging management to be more responsive to stakeholder demands and aspirations, as well as improving sustainability disclosure, foreign ownership can elevate the company's image and strengthen its legitimacy. Consequently, foreign ownership has the potential to bolster corporate governance, maximize stakeholder value, and reduce long-term risks by ensuring detailed and comprehensive ESG reporting.

ESG considerations are now a significant element in investment decisions, as they are regarded as a valuable tool for evaluating company objectives, strategies, and the quality of management (Olahkarsa, 2022). In particular, institutional investors are crucial in advancing ESG transparency due to their long-term investment approach and significant interest in overseeing management (Latifah & Widiatmoko, 2022). Table 2 shows that the average institutional ownership in the manufacturing subsector is very high, indicating a strong push for improved ESG disclosure.

Institutional ownership will encourage management to enhance transparency and accountability in ESG, which could enhance the company's legitimacy (Al Amosh & Mansor, 2020; Fuadah et al., 2022). Research by Qasem et al. (2022) and Zaid et al. (2020) shows that institutional ownership holds most of the shares and cannot easily sell the shares owned. Institutional investors are more likely to monitor a company's strategic decisions than other shareholders. This happens because institutional ownership has long-term investments that encourage them to be more active in monitoring and influencing company policies in ESG disclosure. This research is strengthened by Latifah & Widiatmoko (2022), Sibuea & Arieftiara (2022), Singal & Putra (2019), Yani & Suputra (2020) which state that companies with significant institutional ownership have a greater ability to monitor managerial performance.

Institutional owners, with their considerable power and experience, fulfill agency theory and have an essential role to play in implementing good corporate governance and

promoting transparency in ESG disclosure. Institutional investors, with their expertise in financial statements and ESG analysis, ensure that companies provide clear and accurate ESG information. With such encouragement, companies try to maintain a reputation and legitimacy in the eyes of the public, so institutional investors ensure that management makes optimal ESG disclosures. Thus, institutional ownership has a positive impact in encouraging companies to increase transparency in ESG disclosure in a detailed and comprehensive manner.

The hypothesized outcomes suggest that having an independent board of commissioners has a positive impact on ESG disclosure. The independent commissioners have an essential role in enhancing the company's ability to make strategic decisions and ESG policies, as well as encouraging management to disclose ESG information more transparently (Kamaludin et al., 2022). In addition, independent boards also contribute significantly to ensuring effective communication regarding corporate responsibility and maintaining a balance between operational goals and social responsibility (Chebbi & Ammer, 2022). Based on agency theory, independent commissioners are in a strategic position to perform oversight functions that ensure corporate GCG practices are implemented and financial reports are prepared with high integrity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The independent commissioners play a pivotal function in facilitating ESG disclosure, which serves as a vital communication tool for demonstrating the company's ability to strike a balance between business performance and sustainability performance. An increase in the number of independent commissioners leads to a corresponding rise in the degree of ESG oversight within the company (Septiana & Puspawati, 2022).

Table 5 illustrates the comparative outcomes of Model 1, which includes moderation, and Model 2, which excludes the moderation interaction of the independent board of commissioners. There has been an increment in both the coefficient and the adjusted R², as shown in the table. This demonstrates that the interaction with the independent commissioners confirms its role as a pure moderating variable. The study demonstrates that an independent commissioner acts to moderate the relationship between institutional ownership and ESG disclosure. Institutional ownership, as the largest shareholder, is instrumental in promoting greater transparency in ESG implementation among companies, particularly when supported by a significant degree of independent commissioners' representation. The function of independent commissioners is to reinforce corporate governance by guaranteeing that decisions are impartial and free from personal gain (Romano et al., 2020). They guarantee that companies aim to maximize shareholder value, while also reducing agency conflicts with stakeholders and enhancing a firm's legitimacy (Fernández-Gago et al., 2018). As the number of independent commissioners rises, companies need to ensure they satisfy the expectations of their diverse stakeholders and maintain legitimacy within the scope of their operations.

The appointment of a larger independent board of commissioners will foster increased corporate accountability and transparency, and ensure the provision of high-quality information that can support institutional ownership in making more informative decisions. This research is supported by Zaid et al. (2020) who highlight the importance of independent commissioners in strengthening the effect of institutional ownership on CSR disclosure. A higher proportion of independent commissioners in a company is associated with a stronger capacity to meet the expectations of institutional ownership, which places a high value on transparency in CSR disclosure. Furthermore, Al Amosh & Khatib (2022) propose that an independent commissioner can strengthen the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure by encouraging information transparency to maintain legitimacy and fulfill stakeholder expectations. The recent research by Cucari et al. (2018) and Husted & Sousa-Filho (2019) indicates independent boards are more inclined to engage in ESG activities. A larger independent board of commissioners can encourage companies to meet stakeholder demands regarding ESG disclosure (Ortas et al., 2017).

A significant number of independent commissioners contribute to the strengthening of the company's relationship with institutional ownership through the fulfillment of ESG disclosure standards set by the GRI. With close oversight, independent boards ensure that companies are not only compliant with regulations but also more active in disclosing ESG information. This is particularly important for institutional ownership, which requires transparency to make objective judgments to manage long-term risks. Thus, this study demonstrates that an independent board of commissioners can strengthen the effect of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure.

The outcomes of the hypothesis testing in models 1 and 2 illustrate that company size, as a control variable, has no bearing on ESG disclosure. This result differs from the findings of prior research from Drempetic et al. (2020), Fuadah et al. (2022), and Rocha et al. (2024) which suggest that larger enterprises typically bear heightened responsibilities towards stakeholders. This is reflected in more comprehensive ESG disclosures. However, this outcome is in alignment with the results presented by Wigrhayani & Sapari (2019) which indicate that company size does not impact CSR disclosure. In this study, company size is used as a control variable for ESG disclosure. The limited sample size may be a factor contributing to the lack of observed impact. However, the data in this study demonstrates that some manufacturing companies with limited resources have achieved high ESG disclosure scores. This indicates that awareness of the necessity for ESG disclosure is not exclusive to large companies.

The findings in this study indicate that manufacturing sub-sector companies are increasingly aware of assessing the objectives, strategies, and quality of company management. In the environmental aspect, manufacturing sub-sector companies are committed to reducing waste through prevention, reduction, recycling, and re-use strategies. From a social aspect, companies prioritize employee rights and maintain

good relationships with communities and other stakeholders. Robust corporate governance is a fundamental element in the effective management of operational risks. The GCG principles of openness, accountability, responsibility, independence, and fairness form the foundation for professional and credible company management. The implementation of these principles is particularly important for manufacturing companies that often face challenges they face about the environmental and social repercussions of their operation operational risks. Thus, manufacturing sub-sector companies on the IDX realize that ESG disclosure does not depend on company size. Instead, ESG disclosure is considered an obligation to fulfill the expectations of foreign and institutional ownership through voluntary and comprehensive disclosure.

For a more detailed analysis, the comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 using the random effect model shows significant results. The adjusted R^2 in model 1 with moderation is higher than in model 2 without moderation. In addition, the coefficient of including the independent board of commissioners as a moderating variable is greater than that without moderation. It can therefore be concluded that the model with moderation is stronger than the model without moderation. The OLS results also show that the foreign ownership and institutional ownership dimensions have a statistically significant impact on ESG disclosure. In addition, these results suggest that the independent board of commissioners plays an important role in strengthening the influence of institutional ownership on ESG disclosure. A robustness test was conducted to ensure the reliability of the results. The results show that the impact of foreign and institutional ownership on ESG disclosure is consistent with the overall results of Model 2. These two tests have been evaluated and the results support the validity and appropriateness of the model in this study.

This study contributes to legitimacy, stakeholder, and agency theory by demonstrating their relevance in explaining ESG disclosure practices. Legitimacy theory highlights how companies align with societal expectations to maintain legitimacy, driven by foreign and institutional owners who demand transparency (Ghozali, 2020). Stakeholder theory emphasizes addressing diverse stakeholder needs to foster relationships and value creation, supported by the role of independent boards in balancing business objectives and sustainability (Freeman et al., 2021). Agency theory highlights the role of independent agents in mitigating conflicts, ensuring accountability, and aligning management with shareholder and stakeholder interests, thereby enhancing ESG transparency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The practical contribution of this study emphasizes the importance of appointing independent commissioners within companies. Independent commissioners enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance by significantly improving ESG disclosure. This proactive measure enables companies to address governance-related risks more effectively, thereby fostering transparency, accountability, and sustainability. For companies without independent commissioners, incorporating such a governance

structure is recommended to align with best practices and minimize potential governance issues in the long term. This study emphasizes the importance of expanding the implementation of OJK Regulation No. 51/POJK.03/2017 to encompass all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), not just the banking sector. By mandating ESG disclosures for all listed firms, this policy would promote transparency, accountability, and sustainability across various industries. The broader adoption of this regulation would align corporate practices with global sustainability standards, enhance investor confidence, and contribute to long-term economic and environmental resilience.

5. Conclusion, Implications, and Limitations

Robust findings based on two models show that foreign and institutional ownership have a positive impact on ESG disclosure, especially when moderated by high board independence. This suggests that corporate governance practices collectively, including foreign and institutional ownership structures and board independence, enhance ESG transparency. Based on our results, we suggest practical and theoretical implications for the literature on foreign and institutional ownership structures on ESG disclosure that are important for policymakers, companies, governments, and other stakeholders. Firstly, we recommend that companies adopt a more environmentally conscious approach, prioritizing ethical and socially responsible practices alongside their focus on financial performance. Second, from a theoretical standpoint, our research supports the assumptions contained within agency, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories, which provide insights into how governance practices can manage the reporting function. Namely, the involvement of foreign and institutional ownership structures and independent boards of commissioners on ESG disclosure. Researchers also realize that this study has some limitations. This study only examines ownership structure, independent board of commissioners, and ESG disclosure. For future research, it can consider adding other variables such as managerial ownership, public, profitability, company performance, audit committee, and leverage. In addition, increase the number of samples, extend the observation period, and expand the research area which is not only manufacturing companies to get broader and more general research results. In addition, this study focuses on the moderating role of the independent board of commissioners on the effect of institutional ownership structures on ESG disclosure. Therefore, this study encourages researchers to conduct further research in the future to theoretically examine other significant moderators.

The stakeholder, legitimacy, and agency theoretical frameworks are used to understand the extent to which ownership structure affects ESG disclosure. It is our understanding that previous studies on ESG have not provided an in-depth analysis of the moderating effect of an independent board of commissioners on institutional ownership structures and ESG disclosure. A significant number of independent boards of commissioners adhere to best practice standards of governance, which are evident in their approach to managing relationships with various stakeholders. It is therefore evident that independent boards of commissioners exert a significant influence on

strategic decision-making, both directly and indirectly. Foreign and institutional ownership are interested in reaping long-term benefits from corporate engagement and expenditure on ESG disclosure, so they are more inclined to support investment in ESG activities. In many countries, institutional investors represent the largest shareholder category, affording them the capacity to engage in the monitoring process and influence companies' ESG disclosure engagement, especially under high levels of independent boards of commissioners. It can be reasonably deduced that an independent board of commissioners will act in the best interests of the shareholders. While firm size does not appear to impact ESG disclosure, firms in the manufacturing sector view it as a crucial factor in assessing their strategy and management quality. This suggests that companies are trying to meet the expectations of foreign and institutional shareholders through more detailed and thorough ESG disclosures.

References

Afifah, D., & Novita, N. (2021). Pencapaian target sustainable development goals dengan konsep material flow cost accounting. *Maksimum: Media Akuntansi Universitas Muhammadiyah Semarang*, 11(1), 27–42. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26714/mki.11.1.2021.27-42>

Al Amosh, H., & Khatib, S. F. A. (2022). Ownership structure and environmental, social and governance performance disclosure: the moderating role of the board independence. *Journal of Business and Socio-Economic Development*, 2(1), 49–66. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JBSED-07-2021-0094>

Al Amosh, H., & Mansor, N. (2020). The implications of ownership structure on the environmental disclosure in Jordan. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 10(3), 330–346. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARBSS/v10-i3/7054>

Amidjaya, P. G., & Widagdo, A. K. (2019). Sustainability reporting in Indonesian listed banks. *Journal of Applied Accounting Research*, 21(2), 231–247. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/JAAR-09-2018-0149>

Antonius, F., & Ida, I. (2023). Pengaruh ESG dan intellectual capital terhadap kinerja perusahaan. *Jurnal Ekobis: Ekonomi Bisnis & Manajemen*, 13(2), 126–138. <https://doi.org/http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5694-0745>

Ardina, A. K., & Novita, N. (2023). Pegungkapan intellectual capital, corporate governance dan risk management terhadap peningkatan kinerja perusahaan. *Jurnal Akuntansi*, 12(1), 28–45. <https://doi.org/10.37932/ja.v12i1.678>

Aristiningtyas, T. P., & Fidiana, F. (2023). Pengaruh kinerja environmental, social, governance (ESG) terhadap risiko investasi. *Jurnal Ilmu dan Riset Akuntansi (JIRA)*, 12(8).

Atan, R., Alam, M. M., Said, J., & Zamri, M. (2018). The impacts of environmental, social, and governance factors on firm performance: Panel study of Malaysian companies. *Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal*, 29(2), 182–194. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/MEQ-03-2017-0033>

Baba, B. U., & Baba, U. A. (2021). The effect of ownership structure on social and environmental reporting in Nigeria: the moderating role of intellectual capital disclosure. *Journal of Global Responsibility*, 12(2), 210–244. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JGR-06-2019-0060>

Chebbi, K., & Ammer, M. A. (2022). Board composition and ESG disclosure in Saudi Arabia: The Moderating role of corporate governance reforms. *Sustainability*, 14(19), 12173. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912173>

CRMS. (2024). *Mengapa ESG Penting untuk Pertumbuhan Jangka Panjang Perusahaan?* Center for Risk Management & Sustainability.

Cucari, N., Esposito De Falco, S., & Orlando, B. (2018). Diversity of board of directors and environmental social governance: Evidence from Italian listed companies. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 25(3), 250–266. <https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1452>

Darma, B. D., Arza, F. I., & Halmawati, H. (2019). Pengaruh pengungkapan media, kinerja lingkungan dan kepemilikan asing terhadap pengungkapan corporate social responsibility. *Jurnal Eksplorasi Akuntansi*, 1(1), 78–89. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24036/jea.v1i1.63>

Dian, A., & Novita. (2019). Pengaruh penerapan governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) terhadap kinerja perusahaan. *Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi dan Finansial Indonesia*, 3(1), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.31629/jiafi.v3i1.1514>

Drempetic, S., Klein, C., & Zwergel, B. (2020). The influence of firm size on the ESG score: Corporate sustainability ratings under review. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 167(2), 333–360. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04164-1>

Fambudi, I. N., Aryati, T., & Mayangsari, S. (2023). Effect of ESG disclosure, accrual quality, and asymmetric information on future stock returns with prudence as a moderator. *Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University*, 58(5), 497-523. <https://doi.org/10.35741/issn.0258-2724.58.5.38>

Fauziah, F., Novita, N., & Fambudi, I. N. (2024). The role of institutional ownership in moderating ESG disclosure's impact on firm value. *Jurnal REKSA: Rekayasa Keuangan, Syariah dan Audit*, 11(2), 108–121. <https://doi.org/10.12928/jreksa.v11i2.10534>

Fernández-Gago, R., Cabeza-García, L., & Nieto, M. (2018). Independent directors' background and CSR disclosure. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 25(5), 991–1001. <https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1515>

Freeman, R. E., Dmytriiev, S. D., & Phillips, R. A. (2021). Stakeholder theory and the resource-based view of the firm. *Journal of Management*, 47(7), 1757–1770. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206321993576>

Fuadah, L. L., Mukhtaruddin, M., Andriana, I., & Arisman, A. (2022). The ownership structure, and the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure, firm value and firm performance: The audit committee as moderating variable. *Economies*, 10(12), 314. <https://doi.org/10.3390/economies10120314>

Ghozali, I. (2020). *Grand Theory: Teori Besar Ilmu Manajemen, Akuntansi dan Bisnis* Yoga Pratama.

GRI. (2024). *About GRI*. GRI. <https://www.globalreporting.org/about-gri/>

Guo, M., & Zheng, C. (2021). Foreign ownership and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China. *Sustainability*, 13(2), 508. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/su13020508>

Husain, I. H. A. (2019). *Ketahanan Dasar Lingkungan: Basic Environment* (Vol. 1). SAH MEDIA.

Husted, B. W., & Sousa-Filho, J. M. de. (2019). Board structure and environmental, social, and governance disclosure in Latin America. *Journal of Business Research*, 102, 220–227. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.01.017>

Isyauqina, R. N., & Fambudi, N. (2024). Prudence accounting, leverage, and firm value: The perspective signaling theory. *Journal of Management, Accounting, General Finance: An International Economic Issues (Marginal)*, 3(3). <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55047/marginal.v3i3.1312>

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305–360. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X\(76\)90026-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X)

Kamaludin, K., Ibrahim, I., Sundarasen, S., & Faizal, O. (2022). ESG in the boardroom: evidence from the Malaysian market. *International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility*, 7(1), 4. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40991-022-00072-2>

Khan, T. M., Gang, B., Fareed, Z., & Khan, A. (2021). How does CEO tenure affect corporate social and environmental disclosures in China? The moderating role of information intermediaries and independent board. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28, 9204–9220. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-11315-9>

Latifah, F. N., & Widiatmoko, J. (2022). Pengaruh struktur kepemilikan terhadap corporate social responsibility dan dampaknya pada nilai perusahaan. *JIMAT (Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa Akuntansi) Undiksha*, 13(03), 921–937. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.23887/jimat.v13i03.44363>

Ningwati, G., Septiyanti, R., & Desriani, N. (2022). Pengaruh environment,social and governance disclosure terhadap kinerja perusahaan. *Goodwood Akuntansi dan Auditing Reviu*, 1(1), 67–78. <https://doi.org/10.35912/gaar.v1i1.1500>

Olahkarsa. (2022). *Mengapa Perusahaan Perlu Beralih dari CSR Menjadi ESG?* Olahkarsablog.

Ortas, E., Álvarez, I., & Zubeltzu, E. (2017). Firms' board independence and corporate social performance: A meta-analysis. *Sustainability*, 9(6), 1006. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su9061006>

Prameswari, S. N., & Fambudi, I. N. (2024). The influence of ESG disclosures on financial distress considering the director's financial expertise as a moderating factor. *Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan* 12(1), 805-818. <https://doi.org/10.17509/jrak.v12i1.67959>

Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., & Gallego-Álvarez, I. (2019). An international approach to the relationship between board attributes and the disclosure of corporate social responsibility issues. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 26(3), 612–627. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1707>

Qasem, A., AL-Duais, S. D., Wan-Hussin, W. N., Bamahros, H. M., Alquaif, A., & Thomran, M. (2022). Institutional ownership types and ESG reporting: The case of Saudi listed firms. *Sustainability*, 14(18), 11316. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su141811316>

Rocha, R., Bandeira, A., & Ramos, P. (2024). The Impact of Social Responsibility on the Performance of European Listed Companies. *Sustainability*, 16(17), 7658. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16177658>

Romano, M., Cirillo, A., Favino, C., & Netti, A. (2020). ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) performance and board gender diversity: The moderating role of CEO Duality. *Sustainability*, 12(21), 9298. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12219298>

Septiana, W. R., & Puspawati, D. (2022). Analisis good corporate governance terhadap pengungkapan ESG di Indonesia Tahun 2016-2020. *Fair Value: Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi dan Keuangan*, 4(10), 4274–4283. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.32670/fairvalue.v4i10.1642>

Sibuea, R. M. F., & Arieftiara, D. (2022). Pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, dan budaya organisasi terhadap pengungkapan corporate social responsibility dengan komite audit sebagai variabel moderasi. *Veteran Economics, Management & Accounting Review*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.59664/vemar.v1i1.4836>

Singal, P. A., & Putra, I. (2019). Pengaruh kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan manajerial, dan kepemilikan asing pada pengungkapan corporate social responsibility. *E-Jurnal Akuntansi*, 29(1), 468. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24843/EJA.2019.v29.i01.p30>

Sugiyono, P. D. (2019). *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif Kualitatif dan R&D* (M. Dr. Ir. Sutopo. S. Pd. ALFABETA, CV.

Wigrhayani, N. N. S. W., & Sapari, S. (2019). Pengaruh tipe industri, growth, profitabilitas, dan ukuran perusahaan terhadap pengungkapan corporate social responsibility. *Jurnal Ilmu dan Riset Akuntansi (JIRA)*, 8(8), 1-21. <https://repository.stiesia.ac.id/id/eprint/1273>

Yani, N., & Suputra, I. (2020). Pengaruh kepemilikan asing, kepemilikan institusional dan leverage terhadap pengungkapan corporate social responsibility. *E-Jurnal Akuntansi*, 30(5), 1196. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.24843/EJA.2020.v30.i05.p10>

Zaid, M. A. A., Abuhijleh, S. T. F., & Pucheta-Martínez, M. C. (2020). Ownership structure, stakeholder engagement, and corporate social responsibility policies: The moderating effect of board independence. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 27(3), 1344–1360. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1888>